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DIFFICULTIES OF SIMPLICITY 
 
Cody M. Bradley 
 
 
Introduction  
The doctrine of divine simplicity, that God is not composed of any kind of 
proper parts whatsoever, can perhaps be seen as early as in Parmenides, reaches 
its zenith in scholasticism, and still today remains Catholic dogma. Despite being 
central to medieval theology, the doctrine—at least in its strongest form—is 
rejected by many contemporary theologians and philosophers of religion. 
However, in recent years some philosophers have defended divine simplicity by 
conjoining it with truthmaker theory, what Noël Saenz calls “divine truthmaker 
simplicity.”1 The aim of this paper is to show that the doctrine of absolute divine 
simplicity, even in its relatively new truthmaker form, still suffers from 
difficulties which undermine its plausibility. 
What & Why 
As Yann Schmitt point outs, simplicity is a “scale notion,” bearing a range 
of variation either within the doctrine itself or closely related to it.2 For example, 
                                                          
1 Noël B. Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2014): 
460. 
2 Yann Schmitt, “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity,” International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 74, no. 1 (2013): 129. 
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Thomas Morris presents a “threefold denial” included in the traditional 
understanding of the doctrine: (1) spatial simplicity, that God has no proper 
spatial parts; (2) temporal simplicity, that God has no proper temporal parts; and 
(3) property simplicity, that God has no proper metaphysical parts.3 Moreover, 
William Alston, while rejecting property simplicity, advocates divine cognitive 
simplicity, in which all of God’s knowledge is a single non-propositional 
intuition.4 Similarly, J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig postulate a type of 
divine creative simplicity in which God’s creation and conservation of the world 
is a single act in itself, rather than multiple individual acts.5 
Of the simplicities mentioned above, spatial simplicity is the only 
uncontroversial one among philosophers and theologians within monotheistic 
traditions. The most controversial one, and the one this paper seeks to further 
explore, however, is property simplicity, or what Schmitt calls “absolute divine 
simplicity” (DDS). This view posits that God has no kind of metaphysical 
composition or complexity whatsoever. On DDS, (1) God is identical to his 
essence/nature/existence, (2) God is identical to his properties, and (3) God’s 
                                                          
3 Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology, ed. C. Stephen 
Evans, Contours of Christian Philosophy (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1991), 114. 
4 William P. Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?,” Religious Studies 20, no. 3 (1986): 287-306. 
5 J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian 
Worldview (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 526. 
Bradley 2 
 
Quaerens Deum  Spring 2016     Volume 2     Issue 1 
 
properties are identical to each other.6 Eleonore Stump explains the doctrine as 
follows: 
For all things other than God, there is a difference between what 
they are and that they are, between their essence and their 
existence; but on the doctrine of simplicity the essence that is God 
is not different from God's existence. Therefore, unlike all other 
entities, God is his own being.7 
 
Some of the motivations for this doctrine are fairly straightforward. If 
there is no distinction between God and his properties, then this avoids the 
problem of God being dependent upon his properties for his existence and 
composition, thus preserving what Alvin Plantinga calls the “sovereignty-aseity 
intuition.”8 Moreover, as noted by Nicholas Wolterstorff, DDS provides a sort of 
“theoretical fecundity” from which other apparent divine attributes such as 
incorporeality, eternality, and others naturally flow.9 Bearing this in mind, it is no 
wonder that Aquinas introduces God’s simplicity in his Summa Theologica right 
after arguing for God’s existence. 
Difficulties 
                                                          
6 Aquinas Summa Theologica I q.3 a.3. 
7 Eleonore Stump, “God's Simplicity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and 
Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 135-36. 
8 Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 1-2. 
9 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity,” in Philosophical Perspectives: Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1991), 5:531. 
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 A standard argument against DDS, most notably put forth by Plantinga, is 
that the doctrine seems to deny God’s personhood because it identifies him with 
his properties.10 Such an argument can run as follows: 
(1) God is identical to his properties. 
(2) If (1), then God’s properties are transitively identical. 
(3) If (2), then God’s properties amount to a single super-property. 
(4) If (3), then God is identical to a super-property. 
(5) If (4), then God is a property. 
(6) Properties are abstract entities. 
(7) Therefore, God is an abstract entity—(1), (5), (6). 
(8) Abstract entities are causally inefficacious. 
(9) Therefore, God is causally inefficacious—(7), (8). 
(10) God is a person. 
(11) Persons are causally efficacious. 
(12) Therefore, God is causally efficacious—(10), (11). 
(13) (9) and (12) contradict each other. 
(14) (9) follows from (1). 
(15) To avoid contradiction, either (1) or (10) must be 
rejected—(13), (14). 
(16) Given theism, (10) is more difficult to reject than (1). 
(17) Therefore, (1) must be rejected—(15), (16). 
For now, this may be known as the problem of double identification: coherently 
identifying God with his properties.11 It is often noted, however, that the 
ontological framework from which Plantinga and most other contemporary 
philosophers are working is significantly different than the framework of the likes 
of Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas. According to Wolterstorff, Plantinga’s 
objections are coming from a “relation ontology” in which things such as natures 
                                                          
10 See Plantinga, “Does God Have a Nature?,” 26-61. 
11 Grabbed partially from Schmitt, “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity,” 125. 
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or essences are external, abstract properties that a substance has by way of 
exemplification, and thereby automatically prevents DDS from being a coherent 
doctrine.12 In contrast, the medieval theologians mentioned above, says 
Wolterstorff, were working from a “constituent ontology” in which natures and 
properties are concrete constituents of that which have them. So, the argument 
seen above stands on (6)’s assumption that a constituent ontology and a Mannian-
type property-instance interpretation of DDS which renders God identical to his 
proposed concrete individual properties is false.13 
However, a constituent ontology or property-instance interpretation of 
DDS is generally disregarded even among contemporary defenders of the 
doctrine. The reason for this is that such a framework runs into a number of 
problems, most notable of which is that identifying God as a concrete individual 
property still leaves him dependent upon the universal of which God, as a 
property-instance, stands in relation to, thus undermining God’s aseity, the very 
thing simplicity attempts to preserve.14 Thus, the prominent defender of DDS, 
                                                          
12 Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity,” 540-2. 
13 See William Mann, “Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 18, no. 4 (1982): 451-71; and The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2015 ed., s.v. “Divine Simplicity,” accessed April 6, 
2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/. 
14 See Jeffrey E. Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 25, no. 1 
(2008): 10-14; Brian Leftow, “Is God an Abstract Object?,” Noûs 24, no. 4 (1990): 581-98; and 
Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity,” 531-2. 
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Jeffrey E. Brower states that “it would seem that any account of simplicity that 
could render the doctrine coherent without giving up the traditional conception of 
properties would be preferable.”15 
 The next trouble DDS runs into is what Pruss calls “the multiple attributes 
problem.”16 Pruss states: 
…when God has attributes A and B, then God’s being A is 
ontologically identical with God’s being B. The difficulty is that 
under such circumstances ‘mercy’ and ‘justice’ seem to lose their 
ordinary language meaning and since our linguistic usage is based 
on ordinary language, it becomes meaningless to use the terms 
about God.17 
Schmitt pushes a form of the multiple attributes problem that incorporates W. E. 
Johnson’s and Eric Funkhouser’s work on determinables and determinates.18 Put 
simply, the relationship of a determinate to a determinable is that of Mother 
Teresa’s goodness to goodness itself, Socrates’ wisdom to wisdom itself, and 
yellowness to color itself. Applying this to God, all of God’s attributes are infinite 
determinates of various determinables: infinite goodness, infinite power, and so 
on. However, one could interpret DDS in such a way as to state that God’s 
attributes are a single infinite determinate of the determinable of perfection. On 
                                                          
15 Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” 11. 
16 Alexander Pruss, “On Two Problems of Divine Simplicity,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1:151. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Schmitt, “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity,” 119-121. 
Bradley 6 
 
Quaerens Deum  Spring 2016     Volume 2     Issue 1 
 
this interpretation of DDS, God’s attributes could be welcomed as a single super-
attribute. 
However, Socrates’ attribute of goodness appears to assign two attributes 
to Socrates, namely goodness itself and its particular determinate instantiated by 
Socrates. Likewise, a banana’s yellowness attributes both the predicate of ‘being 
yellow’ and ‘being colored’ to the banana. It seems as though the determinable-
determinate relation inherently assigns a plurality of intrinsic predications to any 
concrete individual. The DDS advocate’s way out of this seems to be to say that 
such a plurality of intrinsic predications about God are simply analogical, as 
opposed to univocal, expressions. So, referring to God’s justice and God’s mercy 
is to refer to different manifestations of the same super-attribute that just is God 
himself, and distinctions in God’s attributes such as justice and mercy exist in 
conception alone, not in reality. Building on Pruss’ remarks, though, if the 
plurality of God’s intrinsic predications are purely analogical expressions they 
seem to lose their meaning, and even contradict the centrality of the determinable-
determinate relation.19 Of course, this does not necessarily render DDS false by 
any means, but simply limits the molds the doctrine can fit in. 
                                                          
19 Ibid, 121. 
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The multiple attributes problem also faces what Schmitt calls “the co-
specificity problem.”20 According to Schmitt, for any divine instance of F, F is co-
specific, meaning “belonging to a common species”, with any instance of F 
whatever.21 So, God’s divine instance of wisdom is co-specific with Socrates’ 
instance of wisdom. However, since God’s divine instance of wisdom is co-
specific with his divine instance of goodness, by transitivity, Socrates’ instance of 
wisdom would be co-specific with Mother Teresa’s goodness. But surely one 
could instantiate wisdom without instantiating goodness. Schmitt recognizes that 
one can escape this problem by again appealing to analogy, but since the doctrine 
of analogy leaves us epistemically uncertain in regards to God’s being, there is no 
guarantee that such analogies are strong enough to sufficiently avoid the co-
specificity problem. 
Defenses 
Christopher Hughes has developed a possible solution to the problem of 
double identification mentioned above by conjoining David Lewis’ theory of first-
level properties and W. V. O. Quine’s comments on sets.22 According to Lewis, 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Christopher Hughes, On a Complex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in Aquinas' 
Philosophical Theology, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithica: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), 63-67. 
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first-level properties are sets of actual and possible individuals.23 So, on this view, 
the property of ‘being yellow’ will be the set of all actual and possible yellow 
individuals. Similarly, the property of ‘being infinitely powerful’ will be the set of 
all actual and possible infinitely powerful individuals.  
Now, since there is only one individual which is and can possibly be 
infinitely powerful, namely God, this makes the property of ‘being infinitely 
powerful’ identical to the set containing only God. According to Quine, some 
interpretations of set theory have it that a singleton, a set with only one member, 
can be identical with the individual in it.24 Now, consider the following argument: 
(1) First-level properties are sets of actual and possible individuals. 
(2) ‘Being infinitely powerful’ is a first-level property. 
(3) God is the only individual that actually does or can possibly 
have the property of ‘being infinitely powerful’. 
(4) Therefore, the first-level property of ‘being infinitely powerful’ 
is a singleton, namely a set with only God as its member—(1), 
(2), (3). 
(5) A singleton can be identical with the individual in it. 
(6) Therefore, God can be identical to the singleton ‘being 
infinitely powerful’—(4), (5). 
(7) A singleton, as a set, is identical to a property. 
(8) Therefore, God can be identical to the property ‘being 
infinitely powerful’—(6), (7). 
(9) If (8), then God can be identical to a property. 
(10) Therefore, God can be identical to a property—(8), (9). 
(11) God is a concrete individual. 
(12) Properties are abstract entities. 
                                                          
23 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2015 ed., s.v. “Divine Simplicity,” accessed 
April 6, 2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/.  
24 Ibid; Schmitt, “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity,” 124. 
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(13) Therefore, God can be both a concrete individual and an 
abstract entity—(10), (11, (12). 
 
Although it may very well be the case that there could not possibly be two 
infinitely powerful individuals—for, as Schmitt points out, two infinitely 
powerful individuals might limit one another by a conflict of will and ability—it 
is not entirely obvious that there could not possibly be two infinitely 
knowledgeable or infinitely good individuals, for instance; there is no obvious 
contradiction between two individuals that know all true propositions.25 
Moreover, (13) seems to be categorically false. How can an abstract entity 
be identical to a concrete individual? Schmitt, in Hughes’ defense, argues that 
although he shares this immediate concern of (13) being a category mistake, if 
one defines ‘abstract’ as existing outside of space-time and ‘concrete’ as causally 
efficacious, then God can exist both as an abstract and concrete individual.26 But 
such a definition of ‘abstract’ simply becomes interchangeable with what 
philosophers and theologians typically ascribe to God as ‘transcendence’, and the 
word thus loses all of its relevance. 
 In more recent years, advocates of DDS such as Pruss, Jeffrey E. Brower, 
Michael Bergmann, and even Graham Oppy have interpreted DDS in light of 
                                                          
25 Schmitt, “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity,” 124. 
26 Ibid. 
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truthmaker theory to argue for the doctrine’s coherence.27 Brower, the leading 
defender of divine truthmaker simplicity (DTS), presents a “truthmaker account 
of predication” to support DDS: 
(TA) If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s 
F-ness exists, where this entity is understood as the truthmaker for 
“a is F”.28 
 
On this interpretation of DDS, God does not become identical with a property or 
state of affairs, but becomes identical with the truthmakers for his intrinsic 
essential predications, where the truthmaker for these intrinsic essential 
predications are identified as individuals. Thus, if God is identical to the 
truthmakers for his intrinsic essential predications, and the truthmakers for his 
intrinsic essential predications are individuals, God will not be identical to 
anything that is not an individual. In Brower’s own words: “God is identical with 
the truthmakers for each of the true (intrinsic) predications that can be made about 
him.”29 If this be the case, DTS would alleviate DDS from the problem of double 
identification and any potential problem with DDS not allowing for God to 
                                                          
27 See Pruss, “On Two Problems of Divine Simplicity,” 150-67; Brower; Michael Bergmann and 
Jeffrey E. Brower,“A Theistic Argument Against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and 
Divine Simplicity),” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, ed. Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 2:357-86; Graham Oppy, “The Devilish Complexities of Divine 
Simplicity,” Philo 6, no. 1 (2003): 10-22. 
28 Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” 27. 
29 Ibid, 31. 
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possess intrinsic accidental properties. So, this interpretation of DDS appears very 
promising. 
 Now, on DTS, that in virtue of which ‘God is good’ is true is the very 
same thing in virtue of which ‘God is wise’ is true, namely God. Brower 
contends: 
Socrates himself, just in virtue of being the concrete individual he 
is, can be regarded as the truthmaker for “Socrates is human”, 
“Socrates is an animal”, “Socrates is a material object”, “Socrates 
exists”, “Socrates is identical with himself”, and so on.30 
 
He uses this to postulate that God himself, just in virtue of being the concrete 
individual he is, can be regarded as the truthmaker for all of his intrinsic essential 
predications. In response to this, Schmitt argues that Brower’s comparison 
between Socrates and God fails because Socrates’ essence or form better serves to 
constitute the minimal truthmaker for Socrates’ intrinsic essential predications 
rather than Socrates himself, especially since Socrates is a material entity, and 
thus not a simple one.31 The implication of this is not that DTS is incoherent—
indeed, Schmitt concedes its coherence—but that simplicity is not the necessary 
minimal truthmaker for God’s intrinsic essential predications, for God’s form or 
                                                          
30 Jeffrey E. Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical 
Theology, ed. Thomas P. Flint and Michael Rea, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 111.  
31 Schmitt, “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity,” 126. 
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essence could just as easily be the truthmaker for his intrinsic essential 
predications, without invoking double identification. 
 Schmitt’s closing demand of DTS proponents is that “we need an 
explanation of truthmaking relation that associates a simple entity with different 
intrinsic predications,”32 bringing the attention back to the multiple attributes 
problem. This is where Saenz’s recent discrepancy with DTS picks up. According 
to Saenz, 
…even if how things intrinsically and essentially are is pre-built 
into the essences of those very things, it does not follow that the 
things that have the essences are good explanations for truths about 
their essences.”33 
 
This appears to be the central problem with DTS: states of affairs serve as 
truthmakers for propositions, but truthmakers do not appear to serve as sufficient 
explanations for states of affairs. Hence why Schmitt is skeptical regarding DTS’ 
use of truthmaker theory and why Saenz claims that “listing Plato as that which 
makes true ‘Plato is a human’ is of no help in telling me what it is that 
metaphysically explains that it is true that he is human,” and thus is “explanatorily 
empty.”34 
Conclusion 
                                                          
32 Ibid, 128. 
33 Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 466. 
34 Ibid, 465. 
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Absolute divine simplicity, though attractive in many respects, without the 
truthmaker interpretation seems to run into too many difficulties to either adopt or 
maintain in one’s conceptual scheme. Divine truthmaker simplicity certainly can 
be said to aid and potentially eliminate multiple difficulties from which DDS 
suffers, but it is not entirely assured that DTS accomplishes its goal. Naturally, 
DTS can only be as strong as truthmaker theory itself, which is a topic deserving 
of its own paper, but granted the coherence and correct application of truthmaker 
theory to DDS, DTS still does not appear to exemplify the virtue of plausibility.   
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